Abstract：WhentheChineseImperialMaritimeCustomsopenedalimiteddailypostalservicetothegeneralpublicin1878,itissuedthefirstpostagestampsproducedbytheChinesegovernment.Aswellasameansofpayment,thesepostagestampswerevisualandtangiblerepresentationsoftheissuingauthority.Notpreviouslyconsideredindetailbyhistorians,thefirstCustomsPostissueprecipitatedastruggleforcontrolamongtheforeignofficialsoftheMaritimeCustomswhicharosefromsignificantdisagreementsoverbothcommunicationsandglobalisationinChina.RobertHartandJamesCampbellsoughttousethenewpostalservicetosituateChinawithinWestern-dominatedglobalnormsofgovernanceandadministration,whileGustavDetring’sfocuswasonexpansionofChinesecommunicationnetworks.Theseconflictingobjectivesspilledintodisagreementsoverthedesignofthefirststamp,whichwereeventuallyresolvedbytheLargeDragons.ThestampdisputeinitiateddeepdivisionsoverauthoritywithintheMaritimeCustomsasDetring’srelationshipwithHartdeteriorated,andDetring’sroleasLiHongzhang’sadvisorexpanded.TheepisodealsoillustratesthediverseandsometimescontradictoryapproachestoChinesereformamongWesternersinthelateQing,andtheircomplexalignmentswithChineseauthoritiesandWesterninterests.
Keywords：Qingpostalsystem,ImperialMaritimeCustoms,RobertHart,GustavDetring,LargeDragonstamp,globalisation
權力之争：赫德、德璀琳與大龍郵票
艾瑪·賴茲（英國）
内容提要：1878年，清王朝海關對公衆開放了有限的每日郵政服務，并發行了海關制造的第一批郵票。除了作為支付手段，這些郵票還成為郵票的發行機構——清王朝海關直觀、有形的代表。中國首張郵票的發行引發了對中國通信與全球化發展存在重大分歧的高級外籍海關職員之間的争權奪利，此前尚無史學家對此進行詳細的研究。赫德和金登幹試圖利用這項新的郵政服務将中國置于由西方主導的國際規則和行政規範之下；德璀琳關注的重點則是進一步擴大中國的通信網絡。這些沖突導緻其在第一枚郵票設計上的分歧，而這次分歧最終在出品大龍郵票的決議上達成共識并得以解決。随着德璀琳與赫德關系的不斷惡化，這場關于中國郵票的争議引發了清朝海關内部的嚴重分裂，而作為李鴻章的顧問，德璀琳的權力則不斷擴張。這一段曆史還展現了晚清時期外籍關員對于洋務運動的多元的甚至有時自相矛盾的态度，以及他們在平衡清政府權威和西方國家利益方面的“騎馬”心态。
關鍵詞：清朝郵政制度清朝海關赫德德璀琳大龍郵票全球化趨勢
HartandtheLargeDragons
On4July1877,atelegramwassentfromLondontoChinafortheattentionofRobertHart,InspectorGeneraloftheChineseImperialMaritimeCustoms.Harthadbeenknowntochidesubordinatesforprofligateuseofthetelegraph,butthesenderwasadamantthat‘afewtelegramsarenottobegrudged’topreventexpensivemistakes.2ThetelegramwassentbyHart’sLondonagent,JamesDuncanCampbell,andheconsideredthemattersufficientlyurgenttodisturbHartduringhistourofChina’streatyportsinthesummerof1877.ThetopicofCampbell’sfrantictrans-globalcommunicationwasthedesignandproductionofChina’sfirstCustomsstamp.
Postalrequisitionimpracticable.MachinePaperInkallunsuitable…SpecialexperiencerequiredTimeexpensesaved&protectionfromforgeryensuredbystartingmanufactureheretransferringtoChinaafterwards.3
CampbellwasoneoftheearliestpeopletoappreciatetheimportanceofthedesignofthefirstpostagestampissuedbyapartoftheChinesegovernment,buthewascertainlynotthelast.Onehundredandfortyyearslater,interestinthefirstCustomsstampremainshigh.TheessayswhichwerethesubjectofCampbell’stelegram-andwhichwerenevermadeintoastamp-soldin2017attheInterasiaauctionhouseforoverHK$2m.4
TheearlyCustomsPostandtheLargeDragonstampsof1878offerawindowontotheintersectingstrugglesfornational,imperialandglobalcontrolinlateQingChina.TheestablishmentofalimitedpublicpostalserviceundertheMaritimeCustomsfrom1878wasoneofseveralincrementalstepstowardstherealisationofoneofRobertHart’slongstandingaspirations:theevolutionoftheCustomsPostin1896intotheImperialPost,anationalpostalservicesubordinatetoHart.5Theissuanceofapostagestampin1878wasanimportantelementofHart’splan.6Thenewstampswerethemselvesamessage,symbolisingHart’saspirationsforboththeCustomsandforChinaitself.ModelledonthesystemdevelopedinearlyVictorianBritain,postagestampswereatangiblerepresentationoftheCustoms’approachtoapostalservice.Thesenderwastopayallthecostsatstandardisedpostagerates,andtheservicewastobeopentoallwithoutasubscriptionoranaccount.ThestampswerealsoavisualrepresentationoftheQingstate,andquestionsofdesignandproductionweresymbolicaswellaspractical.
DespitetheimportanceoftheCustomsPost,ithasreceivedrelativelylittlein-depthscholarlyconsideration.EarlyaccountsoftheChinesePostOfficemadeonlybriefreferencestoCustomsPost.7EvenStanleyWright’smonumentaltreatmentofHartandtheMaritimeCustomsemphasisestheestablishmentoftheImperialPostin1896overtheprecedingCustomsPostperiod.8ChengYing-wangottotheheartofHart’sCustomsPostprobleminher1970studyofChinesepostalservicesinthelaternineteenth-century,notingthat‘fromthebeginningHartstressedstricteconomy’andexpectedtheCustomsPosttoberunwithoutasubsidyandwithoutanyreallocationofseniorstaff.ChengconcludedoftheCustomsPostthatitwas‘regularandconvenient[and]…successful’,buttheearlyCustomsPostattimesstruggledonallthreefronts.9TsaiWeipinusespostalroutesbetweenBeijingandZhejianginthewinterof1878/79toilluminatethedifficultiestheCustomsPosthadwhendealingwithterritorialauthorities,notingthat‘thewinterpostalservicedidnotenjoyaparticularlycollaborativerelationshipwiththeprovincialgenerals’.10TheissuanceofthefirstCustomspostagestampshasattractedevenlessattentionfromhistorians.11TheLargeDragonshave,naturally,interestedphilatelists,notablyPhilipIrelandin1978.12Philatelicdiscussionofthestampshas,though,oftenbeencircumscribedbywhatRobertBickershascalledthe‘cultofHart’,whereastheLargeDragonsshouldbeseenalsointhecontextofthechallengestoHart’sauthority,aswellastotheauthorityoftheCustomsandoftheChinesestateitself.13Indeed,theuseofvisualmaterialbytheCustomstoshapeperceptionsofChinaandtheChinesegovernmenthasbeenlargelyneglectedbyscholars.14Thestampswere,thisessaysuggests,atinyportableillustrationofhowtheCustomsthoughtChinashouldbeunderstoodbythewiderworld.
1IamgratefultoAglaiaDeAngeliandtoSpecialCollectionsandArchivesatQueen’sUniversityBelfast.ClareMorrisonprovidedresearchassistance.
2CampbelltoHart,28Dec.1877,no.410inArchivesofChina’sImperialMaritimeCustoms:Confidential,CorrespondencebetweenRobertHartandJamesDuncanCampbell,1874-1907,ed.byXiafeiChenandJung-jangHan,4vols(Beijing:ForeignLanguagesPress,1990),vol.I,p.332.
3Telegram,CampbelltoHart[no.171],4July1877,no.305inChenandHan,vol.III,pp.1058–59.
4‘InterasiaAuctionsLtd.:PricesRealized’,2017
5Ontheestablishmentofanationalpostalservice,seeChengYing-wan,PostalCommunicationinChinaanditsModernization,1860-1896(Cambridge,MA:HarvardEastAsianMonographs,1970);OntheroleoftheImperialPost,seeWeipinTsai,‘TheQingEmpire’sLastFlowering:TheExpansionofChina’sPostOfficeattheTurnoftheTwentiethCentury’,ModernAsianStudies,49.03(2015),895–930
6(2013),1749–81
7H.Kirkhope,‘TheChinesePostOffice:AnHistoricalSurveyoftheQuarter-Century1896-1921’,inReportontheChinesePostOffice:FortheTenthYearofChung-HuaMinKuo(1921)(Shanghai:SupplyDept.oftheDirectorateGeneralofPosts,1922),pp.1–16(pp.6–8);ReprintedasH.Kirkhope,‘TheChinesePostOffice:AnHistoricalSurveyoftheQuarter-Century1896-1921(1922)’,inDespatches,Letters,Memoranda,Etc.Index,ed.byStanleyFowlerWright,DocumentsIllustrativeoftheOrigin,DevelopmentandActivitiesoftheChineseCustomsService,vol.7(Shanghai:StatisticalDept.oftheInspectorateGeneralofCustoms,1937),pp.276–94.Chia-huaChu,China’sPostalandOtherCommunicationsServices(Shanghai,China:ChinaUnitedPress,1937),p.5.
GlobalisationandauthorityinlateQingChina
RecentscholarshiphasfoundglobalisationtobeanilluminatingperspectivefromwhichtoconsiderlateQinghistory.15TheadoptionofWesterninfrastructure‘facilitatedthephysicalincorporationofChinaintowidernetworksandcircuitsaswellasitsalignmentwithdevelopinginternationalnorms’,asRobertBickersargues.16Globalisationisnotaneutraloruncomplicatedphenomenonofinterconnectedness;rather,globalrulesandlinkagescanbeunderstoodasaspaceintowhichpowercanbeprojected,bystatesandothers,andthroughwhichpowercanbeexercised.Fromthisperspective,theexpansionofthepostalserviceoperatedbytheImperialMaritimeCustomswasnotmerelyastepintheincorporationofChinaintoglobalpostalnetworks,butwasalsoabattlegroundinawidertussleamongthemajorpowerstowieldinfluenceovertheshapeofglobalisation.RatherthaninsertinglateQinghistoryintoaframeworkofeitherglobalisationorimperialism,theglobalnetworksestablishedinthisperiodilluminatethestruggleforinfluencebetweenandwithintheforeignpowersandtheChinesestate.
TheCustomsPostisaprominentvantagepointfromwhichtoconsiderdebatesoverglobalisationinChinainthelateQingperiod.TheImperialMaritimeCustomswasglobal,imperialandChineseallatonce:achimeramandatedbyBritishtreaty.The1858TreatyofTianjinwhichBritainextractedduringtheSecondOpiumWarcommittedChinatoasignificantexpansionofforeigntrade,butleftthedetailsvague.17Inthefollowingmonths,British,FrenchandAmericannegotiatorsconcludedthe‘AgreementcontainingRulesofTrade’of8November1858,detailinghowtheTreatyofTianjinshouldbeimplemented.RuleXrequireda8TheCustomsPostisdiscussedinStanleyFowlerWright,HartandtheChineseCustoms(Belfast:W.Mullan,1950),pp.5–6,316–17.9ChengYing-wan,pp.75,76.
10WeipinTsai,‘BreakingtheIce’,p.1751.
11TheDragonstampsaretouchedonbyChengYing-wan,p.74.
12PhilipWillardIreland,China:TheLargeDragons,1878-1885(London:Ro.Lowe,1978).OtherusefulphilatelicworksincludePercivalDavid,‘Sketches,EssaysandProofsofChina’sFirstIssue’,LondonPhilatelist,March1949;RobertC.H.Lee,‘China,theFirstIssue[inThreeParts]’,TheCollectorsClubPhilatelist,September1952;JeffreySchneider,‘ACensusoftheCustomsPostMarkingsinthePre-PhilatelicPeriod’,JournalofChinaPhilately,3(2008),245–61.
13RobertBickers,‘Anglo-JapaneseRelationsandTreatyPortChina:TheCaseoftheChineseMaritimeCustomsService’,inTheInternationalHistoryofEastAsia,1900–1968:Trade,IdeologyandtheQuestforOrder,ed.byAntonyBest(London:Routledge,2010),p.49;Seee.g.Ireland,chap.1pt2.
14ThereisabriefdiscussionofpostalvisualitiesatWeipinTsai,‘TheQingEmpire’sLastFlowering’,pp.916–18.
15JoannaWaley-Cohen,TheSextantsofBeijing:GlobalCurrentsinChineseHistory(London:W.W.Norton&Co.,1999);LydiaHeLiu,TheClashofEmpires:TheInventionofChinainModernWorldMaking(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2004);RudolfWagner,JoiningtheGlobalPublicWord,Image,andCityinEarlyChineseNewspapers,1870-1910(Albany,NY:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,2007).
16RobertBickers,‘InfrastructuralGlobalization:LightingtheChinaCoast,1860s–1930s’,TheHistoricalJournal,56.2(2013),431–458(p.433)
17HoseaBallouMorse,TheInternationalRelationsoftheChineseEmpire(NewYork:Longmans,Green,andCo,1910),vol.II,p.31.
uniformsystem[ofCustoms]…ateveryport.TheHighOfficerappointedbytheChinesegovernmenttosuperintendforeigntrade…willbeatliberty…toselectany[British]subjecthemayseefittoaidhimintheadministrationoftheCustomsrevenue.18
Thisledtothecreationofaforeign-staffedbody-brieflyBritishalone,theninternational-toadministerthetaxationofChina’sinternationaltrade.TheMaritimeCustomsabsorbedandexpandedupontheforeign-controlledcustomsadministrationwhichhadbeenestablishedatShanghaiin1854,reproducingthesystemacrossChina’sothertreatyports.TheRulesofTradebroughttheMaritimeCustomsintotheQingstate,unlikeitsShanghaipredecessor,thoughthiscontrolwasrarelyfeltinday-to-dayadministration.19AcomparativelyrareexampleofChineseofficialinterventioninroutineMaritimeCustomsactivitycamenotfromtheYamenitselfbutfromLiHongzhang,thepowerfulViceroyofZhili,whoin1884demandedHartsendGustavDetring,aCustomsCommissionerandcloseadviserofLi,fromGuangzhoubacktoTianjin.20Suchincidentsweretheexception,however.
TheMaritimeCustomscertainlyhad‘asignificantpartinrepresentingBritishandotherforeigninterestsinChina’.21ThoughanarmoftheChinesegovernment,theforeign-dominatedMaritimeCustomswascommittedbybothpracticeandtreatytopromotingChina’sglobaltrade.HartinstructedhisstaffthatthedutiesoftheCustomsincludedensuringthattradewas‘asmuchfacilitated,andaslittlefettered,aspossible’,butheremindedthemthatthiswastoensurethat‘thecoffersofthe[Qing]revenuearemostrapidlyfilled’.22Whenforeignershadtheearofgovernments,disagreementsbetweenthemcouldbeverysignificantindeed.HansvandeVenhassaidofHartandtheincreasinglypowerfulTianjinCommissioner,Detring,thattheywereattheendofthecentury‘bothconstituentsofaninternationalnetworkofentrepreneurs,statesmen,journalists,anddiplomats…[who]representeddifferentstrainsinit.Hartstoodfortheidealsofliberalprogress…orientedtowardtheworldoftheBritishempire…DetringwasconnectedtoGermany…[and]wasinspiredbyvisionsofnewglobalentrepreneurship.’23OneInspector-General,FrederickMaze,wentsofarastodescribetheMaritimeCustomsas‘anoutpostoftheBritishempire’.24Divergencesbetweenforeignerswerenotalwaysonnationallines;oneofthemostimportantdisagreementsamongforeignersregardingChinesepostalserviceswasbetweenHartandanotherBriton,ThomasWade.Britishofficials,ontheotherhand,sometimesconsideredRobertHartinparticulartobeunderminingtheBritishpositionratherthanstrengtheningit.
CustomspostalservicesdevelopedwiththesupportofpartsoftheChinesegovernment,buttherewasnoconsensusbefore1896amongeitherChineseofficialsorforeignpowersaboutthebestwaytoproceed.ExpansionofCustomspostalserviceswasenergeticallyopposedbythose-bothChineseandforeign-whoobjectedtothepotentialdisplacementofChina’spatchworkofexistingpostalservices,orwhoconsideredthatapublic,nationalpostalservicewasnotanappropriateundertakingfortheimperialgovernment.Amajorbrakeonthedevelopmentofagovernment.25postalservice,generallyoverlookedbyscholars,wasafearsharedbyWesternersandforeignersabouttheamountofinfluencewhichanyoneheadinganationalpostalservicewouldbeabletoexercise.Suchalargebureaucracywouldhavepoliticalgravity,nottomentionthedirectcontrolitwouldexerciseovertheflowofcommercial,politicalandpersonalinformation.EarlyChinesepostalservicescanbeunderstoodaseithersubvertingorsupportingWesternpressureontheChinesestate.ForTsaiWeipin,thesocialpurposeofthePostwasincompatiblewiththeobjectivesoftheMaritimeCustoms,sincethePostwasthere‘toservethewholeoftheChinesepopulationratherthanjustthoseindividuals,companies,andofficialsconcernedwithforeigntrade’.26ConverselyLaneHarrisarguesthatHart’spreoccupationwiththePostarosefromafundamentalmisunderstandingofQinggovernanceandhiseffortstoWesterniseit.27Hartcomplainedin1896that:
18WilliamFrederickMayers,TreatiesbetweentheEmpireofChinaandForeignPowers,TogetherwithRegulationsfortheConductofForeignTrade,&c.&c.&c.(Shanghai:J.BroadhurstTootal,1877),pp.30–31.
19Wright,HartandtheChineseCustoms,pp.133–34.
20HarttoCampbell27Apr.1884,no.477inTheI.G.inPeking:LettersofRobertHart,ChineseMaritimeCustoms,1868-1907,ed.byJohnKingFairbank,KatherineFrostBruner,andElizabethMacLeodMatheson,2vols(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1975),vol.I,p.541.
21DonnaBrunero,Britain’sImperialCornerstoneinChina:TheChineseMaritimeCustomsService,1854-1949(NewYork:Routledge,2005),p.9.
22RobertHart,‘TheCustomsService,theSpiritThatOughttoAnimateIt,thePolicyThatOughttoGuideIt,theDutiesItOughttoPerform;GeneralConsiderationsandSpecialRules(21June1864),CircularNo.8of1864,1stSer.’,inInspectorGeneral’sCirculars,1861to1892,ed.byStanleyFowlerWright,Documents,vol.1,pp.36–47(p.41).
23HansvandeVen,‘RobertHartandGustavDetringduringtheBoxerRebellion’,ModernAsianStudies,40.3(2006),631–62(pp.660–61).
24NicholasR.Clifford,‘SirFrederickMazeandtheChineseMaritimeCustoms,1937-1941’,TheJournalofModernHistory,37.1(1965),18–34(p.20)
the[Sino-Japanese]negotiationdoesnotprogress…TheGovernmentofChinaisapuzzle...ThereisaGovt.anditcontinuallyisfelt,butit’smoreofanatmospherethanabodyandthere’snolocatingitforgrapplingpurposes.28
ThedisagreementswithintheMaritimeCustomsbetween1876and1878overtheproductionoftheCustomsstampcanbeunderstood,asthisessayargues,alongsidewiderquestionsofChinesereform,withHartononeside,andDetringandLiHongzhangontheother.WhileDetringwasfocusedontangibleinfrastructure,Hart’sfocuswasonusinginstitutionssuchasapostalservicetopositionChinawithinWesternnormsofthestate.InHart’sview,thecomplexityoftheQingstateimpededChina’sinternationalrelations.BycreatingstructureswithintheChinesestatewhichforeignerscouldrecogniseandcomprehend,HartbelievedthatChinacouldstrengthenitsinternationalpositionwithouttheprematureunravellingofChinesepracticesofgovernance.Harthimselfspentthebulkofhiscareerinjustsuchastructure:insomerespects,hisMaritimeCustomsresembledanoffshootoftheBritishcivilservicetransplantedintotheChinesegovernment.InlinewithHart’spreoccupationwithstructuresandbureaucracies,hearguedforChinatoestablishforeigndiplomaticmissionsandtoseektouseinternationallawtoitsbenefit.29
Morebroadly,HartandtheCustomshadacentralroleinChina’sintegrationintowhatRobertBickerscallsthe‘globalencyclopaedia’:thecompendiumofknowledgecontrolledbyWesternersandbuiltonWesternglobalnetworks.30ByrepresentingChinaglobally,theCustomshadanopportunitytoshapehowChinawasperceived.AnationalpostalservicewasforHartasmuchaboutshapinghowtheChinesestatewasperceivedbyoutsidersasitwasaboutchangingChina.TheCustomscoordinatedtheChinesepresenceatnumerousinternationalexhibitionsinthisperiod,includingParisin1878,thesameyearasthestamp.Throughpostagestampsonlettersarrivinginforeignofficesandhomes,justasthroughexhibitions,HartcoulddirectlyinfluencehowChinawasseenintheWest.31Muchofthe‘branding’lateradoptedfortheImperialPostafter1896haditsoriginsintheCustomsPostof1878.32
EarlyCustomspostalservices
TheinvolvementoftheChineseImperialMaritimeCustomsinthepostalservicewasnotoutoftheordinaryforwhathadalwaysbeenunderstoodasfarmorethansimplyataxationcollectionagency.TheruleoftradewhichledtotheestablishmentoftheMaritimeCustomsrequiredthatitwouldalsohaveresponsibilitiesin
inthepreventionofsmuggling,inthedefinitionofportboundaries,orindischargingthedutiesofharbourmaster;alsointhedistributionoflights[i.e.lighthousesandlightships],buoys,beacons[etc.].33
ThefirstInspector-GeneraloftheImperialMaritimeCustomswasHoratioNelsonLay,buthewasdismissedin1863forinvolvementinamisconceivedattemptto,astheBritishMinisterinBeijingputit,‘makeChinathevassalofEngland…[which]showedanutterincapacitytocomprehendChina’.34InMarch1861,RobertHartwasappointedjointActingInspectorGeneralofthenewMaritimeCustoms.35AfterLay’sdismissal,Hartwasappointedformallyin1863asthesoleI.G.,andunderRobertHart,theMaritimeCustomsbecameavastinfrastructuraladministration,supervisingnavigation,lighthousesandsurveys.36
26WeipinTsai,‘TheQingEmpire’sLastFlowering’,p.898;SeealsoTsaiWeipin,‘Jiaotong,YouzhengYuJindaiZhongguoShehuiBiandong交通、郵政與近代中國社會變動[Transportation,PostalServiceandSocialChangeinModernChina]’,史學月刊(JournalofHistoricalScience),8.1(2016),10–13.
27LaneJeremyHarris,‘ThePostOfficeandStateFormationinModernChina,1896-1949’(unpublishedPh.D.,UniversityofIllinoisatUrbana-Champaign,2012),p.13.
28HarttoCampbell,12Jan.1896,no.1003inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.II,p.1047.
29RobertHartandChina’sEarlyModernization:HisJournals,1863-1866,ed.byRichardJ.Smith,JohnK.Fairbank,andKatherineF.Bruner(London:HarvardUniversityPress,1991),pp.287,291;Chih-HuiTsai,‘RobertHart’sRelationshipwiththeLateQingBureaucracy’(unpublishedPh.D.,Queen’sUniversityBelfast,2016).
30RobertBickers,TheScrambleforChina:ForeignDevilsintheQingEmpire,1800-1914(London:AllenLane,2011),p.201.
31JenniferPitman,‘China’sPresenceattheCentennialExhibition,Philadelphia,1876’,StudiesintheDecorativeArts,10.1(2002),35–73;HyungjuHur,‘StagingModernStatehood:WorldExhibitionsandtheRhetoricofPublishinginLateQingChina,1851-1910’(unpublishedPh.D.,UniversityofIllinoisatUrbana-Champaign,2012).
32Onthe‘branding’oftheImperialPost,seeWeipinTsai,‘TheQingEmpire’sLastFlowering’,pp.916–17.
33Wright,HartandtheChineseCustoms,p.134.
HartclaimedtohavefirstproposedthecreationofaChinesepostofficeinhisintroductorymeetingswithPrinceGongandtheinfluentialChineseofficialWenxiang,inthesummerof1861.37AmongseveralreasonswhyHart’sclaimisplausibleisthathehadapersonalconnectiontopostaladministration:hewasclosetohismaternaluncleRichardEdgar,whowasfromatleast1842untilhisdeathin1865thepostmasterinPortadown,theIrishtownwhereHartwasborn.38Sucharadicalproposaldidnotfindofficialfavour,andHartseemsnottohavebroughtitupagainforanotherfifteenyears.39Hart’s1865memorandumJuweipangguanglun局外旁觀論[ABystander’sView]issometimescitedinconnectionwithapostalservice,butHartinthatdocumentwascarefultomentiononlytelegraphs,andnotanationalpost.40Thiswasnotanaccident,butadeliberateconsequenceofadistinctionHartwasattemptingtodrawbetweenWesterntechnology(whichhearguedChinashouldadoptliberally)andWesternmethods(whereHartadvocatedapiecemealapproach).
TheomissionofpostalservicesfromABystander’sViewisparticularlystriking-andmeaningful-becauseHartrevisedthedocumentin1865justashewasactuallystartingtoorganisealimitedcourierroute.TheCustomsfirstbecameinvolvedinpostalservicesnotasanationalorevenapublicundertaking,butthroughoneveryspecifictask:conveyingthemailofforeignofficialsinBejing.UnderthetreatiesconcludedduringandaftertheSecondOpiumWar,theChinesegovernmentwasobligedtotakeforeigndiplomaticmailfromthenewlyestablishedlegationsinBeijingtothecoast,using‘thegovernmentcouriersemployedforthetransmissionofofficialdespatches’.41Intheautumnof1865,theZongliYamenrequestedthattheInspectorGeneralandhisheadquartersshouldrelocatepermanentlyfromShanghaitoBejing,afterwhichtheZongliYamenaskedtheCustomstotakeovertheYamen’sdiplomaticpostoperations.42TheCustomscollectedtheLegations’post,tookittothecouriersfordispatch,receiveditatitsdestination,andpasseditonforonwarddistribution,aswellascarryingoutthesameprocessinreverseforincomingmail.43Soonafterwards,theCustomsretaineditsowncouriers,allonfoot,paidpertrip.44By1867,theCustomswascarryingmailweeklybetweenBeijingandTianjin,andhadopenedtheservicetoforeignersbysubscriptionoratacostof4tael-centsperstandardletter;nopostagestampswereissued.45CarryingtheLegations’mailalsorequiredtheCustomstomakearrangementsforposttobetakentothecoastduringthewintermonths,whenTianjin’sportwasice-bound.ThisinvolvedanarduousroadjourneytoZhenjiang,takingbetweeneightandtwelvedays,whichtheCustomsfirstoperatedinthewinterof1866/7.46Torunthewinterservice,theCustomsPostneededpostofficesnotonlyattheInspectorate-GeneralinBeijingandatTianjin,butalsoatZhenjiangandShanghai.47FromJanuary1868,thewinterpostalarrangementsforforeignersinBeijingwerealsoopenedtothewiderforeigncommunityinTianjin.48
34FrederickBrucetoHarryParkes,2Jan.1864inBrucetoEarlRussell,13Jan.1864(TNA,FO17/407).
35Circularno.1,30June1861,inInspectorGeneral’sCirculars,1861to1892,ed.byStanleyFowlerWright,Documents,vol.1,p.1.
36CharlesP.Lucas,‘SirRobertHart’,inDespatches,Letters,Memoranda,Etc.Index,ed.byStanleyFowlerWright,Documents,vol.7,pp.375–88.
37RobertHart,‘ChineseImperialPost:InauguratedbyImperialDecree[CircularNo.706,SecondSeries],9thApril1896’,inInspectorGeneral’sCirculars,1893to1910,ed.byStanleyFowlerWright,Documents,vol.2,pp.42–52(p.42);Hart’s1861claimisrejectedbyWeipinTsai,‘BreakingtheIce’,p.1754n11butsheomitsthatHartmadetheassertionhimself.
38MinutesofAppointments,no.54,7Jan.1842,PostalMuseum,London,POST58/70,p.19.OntheEdgars,seeWilliamMontgomery,MethodisminPortadown,ThirdSeries(Belfast:IrishMethodistPub.Co),p.12.TheBelfastandProvinceofUlsterDirectoryfor1852,1(Colvend,Scotland:CastlepointPress,2002),pp.620,622;BelfastandProvinceofUlsterDirectory,7(Belfast:BelfastNews-Letter,1865),pp.859,860.
39ContinuousworktowardsanationalpostalserviceisimpliedbyChengYing-wan,pp.64–65butHart’sdiariesandpaperssuggestotherwise.
40RobertHart,‘JuWeiPangGuangLun局外旁觀論[ABystander’sView]’,inChouBanYiWuShiMo:TongzhiChao籌辦夷務始末：同治朝(Beijing,2008),pp.1666–73;On‘Bystander’sView’,seeLukeKwong,‘Juwaijuneidimiwang:HedePangguansanlunduhou[AstudyofSirRobertHart’sThreeTreatisesbyaBystander]’,inZhongguohaiguanyuZhongguojindaishehui:ChenShiqijiaoshoujiuzhihuadanzhushouwenji中國海關與中國近代社會:陳詩啟教授九秩華誕祝壽文集,ed.byYifengDai(Xiamen:Xiamendaxue,2005),pp.25–45;ChenZhichuan陳志川,Zhongguozaoqiyouzhengdeshiliaokaoshi中國早期郵政的史料考實[AstudyofearlyChinesepostalhistory](Taipei,1965),pp.27–36.
41TheophilePiry,‘ReportontheWorkingofthePostOfficefortheYear1904’,inDecennialReports,1892-1901,Vol.2,AppendixII,pp.xlvff.
42Adateof1863,twoyearsbeforeHart’smovetoBeijing,isprovidedbyChengYing-wan,p.64,butherfootnoteatp.120n13istoWright,HartandtheChineseCustoms,p.316;Wrighthimselfgivesthedateas1865:pp.5,316.
43Piry,p.xlv;Kirkhope,‘TheChinesePostOffice’,p.6.
44Xianfengser.,80vols,inChoubanyiwushimo籌辦夷務始末[Completeaccountofourmanagementofbarbarianaffairs],ed.byWenqing文慶(Beijing:Gugongbowuyuan,1930)juan72:20b;’Chihli’inReportontheChinesePostOffice:FortheTenthYearofChung-HuaMin-Kuo(1921)withWhichIsIncorporatedanHistoricalSurveyoftheQuarter-Century(1896-1921),II.PublicSeries:No.2,18(Shanghai:SupplyDept.oftheDirectorateGeneralofPosts,1922),p.34.
45‘AppendixB:TientsinCustomsPost’,inReportontheChinesePostOffice:FortheTenthYearofChung-HuaMin-Kuo(1921)(Shanghai:SupplyDept.oftheDirectorateGeneralofPosts,1922),pp.105–6.
Hart's1876postalproposal
In1876,fifteenyearsafterhefirstspoketoChineseofficialsaboutanationalpostalservice,HartrevisitedthesuggestionwhilemediatingbetweentheBritishandChineseaftertheMargaryAffair.AjuniorBritishdiplomat,AugustusMargary,waskilledinYunnanin1875,andtheBritishMinisterinBeijing,ThomasWade,madeextensivedemandsoftheChinesegovernmentinresponse.WhentheChinesewouldnotmeetthese,Wadeleftthenegotiationson15June1876,thethreatofwartrailinginhiswake,Harttooktheopportunitytonudgebothgovernmentstowardsthekindofsettlementhehopedtosee.On1July1876,HartvisitedtheAmericanMinisterGeorgeSeward,who‘askedmewhyIdon’ttakeupPostalwork&saidhe’dgivemeallhissupport’.49
Hart’sdecisiontobringthepostalserviceintotheSinoBritishnegotiationswasageneralsurprise.TheCustomshadbeenrunningitscourierservicesince1865,andhadgivennohintofexpansionbeyondtheBeijing-Tianjinrouteandthecross-countrywinterservice.Hart’sABystander’sView,whichanimatedmuchofHart’sthinkinginthedecadeafteritssubmissionin1865,hadnotmentionedapostalservice.Asidefromacoupleofnewspaperarticles,thesubjecthadbeenalmostwhollyignoredbyWesternersandself-strengthenersalike.50BolsteredbytheinterestoftheAmericanministerinthesubject,andnotonetoletanopportunityslide,theverynextday,HartwenttotheZongliYamentodiscusswhatconcessionsChinamightoffertheBritish,andsuggestedthatBritainmightbeinterestedinChinacommittingtoestablishapostalserviceandnationalmint.51On3July,theZongliYamenconfirmedtheywerepreparedtosupporttheenterprise,providedLiHongzhang(theViceroyofZhili,whowastobesenttoconcludethenegotiations)wouldsupportittoo.‘Theywill…mirabiledictu!consenttoPostalSystem&mintifLiapproves!’Hartrecordedinhisdiary.‘TothinkthatIshd.havecarriedtheirthingsinsucharush!Icd.nothavebelieveditpossible:butIwaitedpatientlyfortherighttime,&haveevidentlyputitintherightway.’52Notably,Hartunderlined‘postalsystem’andnot‘mint’;theformerwasapparentlythemoreremarkableofthetwoChineseconcessions,toHart’smind.HartatthispointwasconfidentofBritishsupportforhisproposals,writing‘withthesethingsinmyhandsIoughttobeabletoinduceWadetorecommendthe[British]govt.tobecontent.Ifso,whatareliefitwillbeallround,&,also,whatausefulsettlement!53HartnextwenttoTianjinon10July1876tomeetLiHongzhang,anddiscussedbothapostalservice(withlengthyconsiderationofBritishpostalpractices)andthemint.54Ligavethepostalproposalhissupport,onceHartagreedthattheCustomspostwouldoperateonlyinthetreatyports,andthat‘moneyandmerchandisewillnotbeforwarded.TheChinesexinju[Chinesecommercialletteragencies]invariousplaceswillbeleftundisturbed.’LialsoastutelynotedthattheBritishmightnotbesointerestedintheprojectasHartanticipated.55
LiHongzhangwasthenappointedtoleadtheChinesenegotiations,andwenttomeetWadeinZhifu(Chefoo,modernYantai).56InZhifu,HartwasdelightedthathisproposalshadbroughtWadebacktothenegotiatingtable.‘Ihavebeeninnothingsolikerealworkduringmywholepreviouscareer,andmyhandsarenowsofreethatIfeeleasyandcheerfultoanextentIneverknewbefore’,hewroteon24August.57Hartfelthimselfonthebrinkoftriumph,butwasawarethattheBritishwerenotwhollyinagreementwithhisproposals.Bythispoint,HartandWadewere‘merelyonbowingterms’.ThisatleastrelievedHartofsomeoftheself-imposedstrainofattemptingtoservebothBritishandChineseinterests.
46’Chinkiang’,China:ImperialMaritimeCustoms,DecennialReportsontheTrade,Navigation,Industries,Etc.ofthePortsOpentoForeignCommerceinChinaandCorea,andontheConditionandDevelopmentoftheTreatyPortProvinces,1882-1891,HaiKuanTsungShuiWuSsŭShu.MaritimeCustoms.I.StatisticalSeriesNo.6,1(StatisticalDepartmentoftheInspectorateGeneralofCustoms,1893),p.314.
47Piry,p.xlv.
48’Chihli’,ReportontheChinesePostOffice,p.34.
491July1876inRobertHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,p.129,QUBSC,MS15/1/23.50LaneJeremyHarris,p.169.
512July1876inHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,p.133.
523July1876inHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,pp.133–35.
53Ibid..
54Yishuhangao譯署函稿,vols62-69inLiHongzhang李鴻章,Liwenzhonggongquanji李文忠公全集,165vols(Shanghai,1921)juan5ff33b-35.55LiHongzhang,juan5,ff34b-35;SeealsoChengYing-wan,p.71.
IregretthisprivatelyforIlikethemanandrespecthim,andIalsoregretitforsomeCustoms’considerations.Butinthepresentcrisisnothingcouldbebetterforme:itrelievesmeofallworry,for,nolongerago-between,dodgingbetweenbothfires,Iamplainlyononesideandamabletoworkboldlyandwithenergy.58
ThedisagreementbetweenHartandWadehasbeennotedbyvarioushistorians;Chengstates‘forsomeunknownreason,WadehadafallingoutwithHart’,butthereisnomystery.59Thepressureofbeingonoppositesidesofthenegotiationswasthefinalstrawforthelong-standingbutsometimesuneasyfriendshipbetweenthetwomen.InHart’sview,Wadeendedtheirfriendshipsimplybecause‘Ihavebeenguiltyoftheheinousoffenceofdifferingfromhisviewsandopposinghim,[though]Ihavebeendoingmyduty.’60
LiHongzhangandWadereachedtermson12September,andLisignedtheagreementonthe13th,accompaniedbyHart.61Hartconsidereditanalmostunqualifiedpersonalvictory,notinginhisdiary,‘D.[Detring]calledonLitoday&wastoldthatthemeritofthesettlementhereisentirelymine’.62Afewdayslater,Hartconsidered‘Imyself&theCustomsarefarstrongerthanever!’63HartwroteinsimilartermstoCampbelltwoweekslater,thoughwithabelatedhintofmodesty,‘TheCustomscomeoutofthisaffairstrongerthanever:andIdon’tthinkthere’stheslightestchanceofcapsizefortwentyyearstocome!IbegintothinkIhavesteeredtheshipprettywellafterall:butitwillnotdotobeindulgingincomplacencytoosoon.’64
DespiteHart’sebullientmood,theChefooConventionagreedon13September1876excludedthepostalservice(andthemint).Hartnotedin1896thatthepostofficeplanhadfailedtwodecadeearlierbecauseofwhathecalleda‘conspiracyofsilence’.65SinceLiHongzhangwasakeensupporterofthepostalschemeinfutureyears,Hartwasneverinanydoubtthattheprimemoverinthis‘conspiracy’wasWadehimself.HartclaimedthatWadetoldSewardprivatelythat‘heobjectedtoacceptingMintorPostbecauseitwasputtingtoomanythings-toomuchpowerandtoomuchpatronage-intomy[Hart’s]hands!!!’66WadelaterrelentedandwentbacktoLiHongzhangforaletterconfirmingChina’scommitmenttobothaMintandaPostOffice,butfoundLipredictablyunwillingtobaitpostalopponentsbyimposingadditionalobligationsonChinaafterasettlementhadbeenreached.67
'Workitquietly':expandingtheCustomsPost
Havingcomesounexpectedlyclosetosecuringagovernmentpostalservice,HartwasconvincedthatChinawasonthebrinkofagreatwaveofgovernmentalinnovation.‘IsChinaontheeveofgreatthings?’heaskedhimself,on14September1876,thedayafterLiHongzhangsignedtheChefooConvention.‘Ithinksheis!’Hartannouncedinhisdiary.68FeelingthathispersonalpositioninChinahadbeensignificantlystrengthenedbytheConventionnegotiations,HartpressedhisadvantagealmostbeforetheinkwasdryontheConvention.
56Morse,vol.II,pp.299–301;Wright,HartandtheChineseCustoms,p.409.
57HarttoCampbell,24Aug.1876,no.153Fairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.I,p.223.
58Ibid.,p.224.
59ChengYing-wan,p.71.
60HarttoCampbell,16Feb.1878,no197[Z/21]inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.I,p.265.
6112&13Sep.1876inHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,pp.188–90.6212Sep.1876inHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,p.188.
6315Sep.1876inHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,p.192.
64HarttoCampbell,3Oct.1876[Z/37],no.154inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.I,p.224.
65RobertHart,‘Postal:EnclosingChineseVersionofRegulationsandYamenMemorial;PreviousActionRecorded.CircularNo.709,30Apr.1896’,inInspectorGeneral’sCirculars,1893to1910,ed.byStanleyFowlerWright,Documents,vol.2,pp.55–69(p.55).
66HarttoCampbell,25Oct.1877,no.184inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.I,p.252.
67LiHongzhang,juan6f.30.
Hart’sstrategywastopursueanincrementalexpansionofCustomspostalservices.TheCustomswouldmakeonlysmall,unobjectionablechangestoitspublicpostalservicesuntiltheideaofanationalpostbecamelesscontroversial.LiHongzhang‘promisedtofatherit[theCustomsPost]officiallyassoonasitprovedasuccess’.69ChinesereformerssawHart’ssuddenlyenhancedpoliticalcapitalasausefulasset.On15September(stillatZhifu),HartreceivedavisitfromtheprominentChinesereformerTangTingshu(knowninHart’swritingsas‘TongKing-sing’),alsoakeyallyofLiHongzhang.TangandHart‘talked…aboutPost-he’llassist[Gustav]Detring:hetooisanxioustomakeChinagoahead&willsupportmyself&theCustoms’.70Hartneededallthehelphecouldget.Hewasfullyawarethathisplansmightriletheminjuenterprisesandtheofficialsoperatingtheexistingimperialpostalservices,aswellasthevariousforeign-runlocalpostsinthetreatyports.WritingtoHenryKopsch,Hartprovidednolessthanthreeelaboratedefencesofcaution.‘Ithinkifwekeepsteady,andonlymovewhenready,we’reboundtowinwithouttheleastdisaster…Costisonlydearwhenmoney’spaidforanyschemethatfails…Itisnotawasteoftimetodothingswell’.71
CentraltoHart’splanswasGustavDetring,whowaslargelyresponsibleforthedevelopmentoftheCustomsPostintheyearsimmediatelyafter1876.72AsCustomsCommissioneratZhifuduringtheConventionnegotiations,DetringhadbeenpresentforandinvolvedindiscussionswithLiHongzhangonarangeoftopics,includingpostalservices.HoseaBallouMorse,Detring’ssecretaryfrom1877to1878,notesthatthethirty-four-year-oldDetringwasoneofthetwopeopleLihadthatAugust‘toadvisehim’inhisnegotiationswiththeBritish(alongwithHart).73Significantly,DetringaswellasHartaccompaniedLiatthesigningoftheChefooConvention.74DetringmadeagoodimpressiononLiduringthenegotiations,markingthestartofDetring’sroleasLi’sadvisor,arelationshipwhichenduredforthenextquarterofacentury.75Withinafewyears,Detring’sgrowinginfluencewithLiHongzhangmadehimarivaltoHart.ThepostalserviceprecipitatedthefirstseriousdisagreementsbetweenHartandDetring,thoughbynomeanstheirlast.76
Atleastinitially,HartattemptedtokeepclosecontrolofDetring’spostalwork.HartspentmuchofAugustandSeptemberof1876inZhifuwithDetringduringthenegotiations,diningtogether,discussingandsocialising.Hart’srelationshipwithDetringlaterbecamenotoriouslycomplicated,butin1876,itwascivil,evencordial,despiteHart’soccasionalexasperation.DetringhadjoinedtheCustomsinApril1865,andstruckHartasanunprepossessingcharacter:‘YesterdayDetringarrived,coveredwithboils;heseemsapleasant,intelligentyoungfellow;buthelispssomewhat,&willalwaysspeakChinesewithanaccent.’77By1869,HartwascomplainingthatDetringwas‘pugnacious[and]hot-headed’and‘irascible’.78Nonetheless,in1874,HartwassufficientlyconcernedforDetring’swelfaretoextendhishomeleavebecausehiswifewasunwell.79
Detring’sinitialplanforpostalexpansionwasnotexactlywhateitherHartorLihadbeenexpecting.On3December1876,whileinTianjin,Hartprepareda‘memoforDetringaboutPostalmatters’.80AmongHart’scriticismsofDetring’sapproachwasthathehadneglectedthequestionofpostagestamps.Thefollowingday,HartwenttoseeLiHongzhang,whocomplainedDetring’sproposalwastooambitioustofindfavourinBeijing,withLitellingHarthewas
6814Sep.1876inHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,p.190.
69Piry,p.xlv.7015Sep.1876inHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,p.191.
71HarttoKopsch,citedinKirkhope,‘TheChinesePostOffice’,p.7.
72WeipinTsai,‘BreakingtheIce’,p.1779;Seeesp.Kirkhope,‘TheChinesePostOffice’,p.7.
73Morse,vol.IIp.300andp.300n79.
7412&13Sep.1876inHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,pp.188–90.
75VeraSchmidt,AufgabeundEinflußdereuropäischenBeraterinChina:GustavDetring(1842-1913)imDiensteLiHung-changs(Wiesbaden:Harrassowitz,1984),pp.4,7;TheDirectory&ChronicleforChina,Japan,&thePhilippines,fortheYear1877(HongKong:HongkongDailyPress,1877),p.88.
76Schmidt,p.56;HansvandeVen,pp.660–61.
7722Oct.1865inRobertHart,‘DiaryVol.7’,p.131,QUBSC,MS15/1/7.
78HarttoCampbell,27Jan.1869,no.3and30Jan.1869,no.4inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.Ip.42.
79HarttoCampbell,20June1874,no.99inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.I,p.167.
803Dec.1876inHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,p.248.
interestedinPostalmatter,butthinksDetring’splan(chü-mien)[局面]toolarge–itwdnotdotoputitthatwaybeforetheYamên–wemustworkitquietly&mustnotexpecttoomuch,for,withoutsteamcommunication&withlessactivitythaninEurope,thePostherecannotatoncebecomeawidelyspreadorverypayingaffair.81
StampswereessentialtoHart’splanforseveralreasons.‘Withoutpostagestampswecannotbegin’,Hartwroteinhisdiary.‘ThisiswhatIsaidatfirst,&proposedtostart.’82Firstly,Hartconsideredthatfullprepaymentbythesenderwasessentialinorderforapostalservicetobeaffordableandefficient.Itwasalsoarequirementforparticipationininternationalpostalagreements.83Thiscontrastedwiththepracticeofthexinju,whichgenerallycollectedhalfthepaymentfromtherecipient.Thexinjualsotypicallypermittedmonthlysettlementofaccounts,ratherthandemandingpaymentupfront.84Hartinsistedonprepaymentthroughstampsevenwhenhisstaffsuggestedthat‘prepaymentofpostageisaltogetheralientoChineseideas’.85Hart’sdeterminationtoimposeglobal,andspecificallyBritish,practicesintheCustomsPostensureditwouldnotattractmanyChinesecustomers,atleastatfirst.AlthoughHart’slong-termobjectivewastosupplantthexinjuwithapublicpostalsystem,itwaspoliticallyconvenientfortheCustomsPostinthe1870snottobeseenasacompetitortothexinju,thusavoidingthewrathoftheirproprietors.
Secondly,governmentpostagestampsareasignificantifeasilyoverlookedmethodforrepresentingthestateandprojectinggovernmentpower.SinceHartknewthetake-upofstampsbyChinesewaslikelytobesmall,theaudienceforthisvisualrepresentationofChinesesovereigntywasprimarilyforeign.HarthademergedfromtheConventionwithareneweddeterminationtofurtherChineseinterests.‘SincemysplitwithWade’,hewrotein1877,‘we[theCustoms]arefarstrongerinChina…“goinginaone-er”forChinaalone,Iamfreedfromtheworryoftryingtopleasetwoparties’.86HartwasdevelopinganinterestinvisualdisplaysastheCustomscoordinatedChineseexhibitsatinternationalexhibitions,includingPhiladelphiain1876andParisin1878.Withstampsandexhibitions,HartsoughtnotonlytodevelopforeigncuriosityaboutChina(andthereforetoboosttrade)butalsotoremindtheWesternpublicthatthelegitimateauthorityinChinawastheChinesegovernment,includingtheMaritimeCustoms,andnottheforeignconcessions.
Detring'sstampproposal
ThoughDetringwasuncertainabouttheimportanceofstamps,Hartwasinsistent,andDetringproducedthefirstdesignsforaCustomspostalservicestampearlyin1877.DetringsubmittedthesedirectlytotheCustomsagentinLondon,JamesCampbell,withoutreferringtoHart.87Detringwasimpatienttoproceed,whileHartinthespringandsummerof1877wasstretchedthin.AswellassecuringasetofgunboatsandquarrellingwithWadeovertheCadizhulk(supposedlythecauseofsubsidencearoundZhenjiangharbour),HartwasalsomakingpreparationsforChina’spavilionattheParisExhibitionof1878.Inaddition,HarthadhisroutinedutiesasInspectorGeneral.HeleftBeijingon25March1877totourthetreatyports,afterwhichhereceivedcorrespondenceonlyintermittentlyuntilhisreturnon12October1877.88
NothavingreceivedanyconfirmationfromCampbell,DetringpinnedHartdowninpersonon9MayduringHart’sporttour.HartauthorisedDetringtobuyequipmentforstampproduction,thecostofwhichpaledalongsidetheexpenseoftheChinapavilionforthe1878Parisexhibition,theNorthChinasectionofwhichDetringwasalsoorganising.Atoneparticularlybusy-andexpensive-meetingwithDetringinMay1877,Hart‘handedDetringExhibitioninstructions(Tls20,000)&Postalmemo(2)with£1000topromisemachineryformakingstamps,&c.’.89Thefollowingday,Hart‘askedDetringifIcd.doanythingmore:hesaid-no’.HartrespondedbyadvocatingamanagementphilosophywhichmusthavestruckDetringasironic,comingfromsuchamicromanagerasHart:‘Itoldhimnottowearyhimselfstudyingintricatedetailsbuttopreparethesimplethingsrequiredforamodestbeginning’.90Detringseemstohavetakenthatasamandatetoforgeaheadwiththestampsashesawfit.
814Dec.1876inHart,‘DiaryVol.23’,p.250.
8221Sep.1877inRobertHart,‘DiaryVol.24’,p.247,QUBSC,MS15/1/24.
83Thoughseveraldecadeslater,theImperialPostactuallynegotiatedalimiteddeviationfromthisprinciple:seebelow.
84‘ChinesePostalService’,T’oungPao,5.1(1894),63–64.
85H.KopschtoI.G.,despatchno.24,4February1885,SHAC679(1)14907,citedinWeipinTsai,‘BreakingtheIce’,p.1778.
86HarttoCampbell,5Aug.1877,no.369inChenandHan,vol.Ip.291.
87RobertRonaldCampbell,JamesDuncanCampbell:AMemoirbyHisSon(Cambridge,MA:EastAsianResearchCenter,HarvardUniversity,1970),p.92.
8825Mar.&12Oct.1877inHart,‘DiaryVol.24’,pp.82,258;HarttoCampbell,5Apr.1877,no.336inChenandHan,vol.Ip.266.
DetringhadsentCampbellhisstampdesignsalongwitharequestforCampbell’sopinionandforCampbelltopreparetogetthemprinted,suggestingHarthadapprovedthem.91CampbellhadbeenanofficialintheBritishPostOfficeforafewmonthsin1854,andDetringimpliedthathewasaskingforCampbell’sadvicebecauseofCampbell’spostalexperience.92Inthespringof1877,however,CampbellwasbeingassailedfromseveralquartersinrelationtotheCustomspostalservice,andfearedbeingdrawnintoaturfwaramonghiscolleagues.CampbellwrotetoHarton11MaytocomplainthatanotherCustomsCommissioner,theBritonHenryKopsch,‘now…alsowantsinformationfora“postagesystem”heis“tryingtogetup”’.93Meanwhile,GermaninterestintheCustomspostwasgrowing.AswellasDetring,theambitiousGermanCustomscommissioneratXiamen,F.Kleinwächter,informedtheChineseministerthathewasvisitingBerlintolearnaboutthepost.94HartregardedKleinwächteras‘disputatious’.95Kleinwächterhadstatedhisintentionwasto‘studytheGermanpostalsystemsoastobeabletolendhisservicesifrequiredtoLiHungChang[LiHongzhang]whoinconjunctionwithMr.HartwishedtoestablishPostOfficesatthevariousopenports.’96FacedwiththepossibilityofGermaninterventioninthepostalservice,CampbelladvisedtheChineseauthoritiesthattheyshouldnotassistKleinwächterunlessrequestedtodosobyHartdirectly.
ToCampbell,thislookedatbestlikeover-exuberancebyambitiousCustomsCommissioners,andatworstaconcertedGermanattempttoundermineHart’sauthority.CampbellproposedtotakethestampsoutofthehandsofindividualCommissionersandtohandlethemthroughacompanyinLondon.InspiredbyhisownbrieftimeintheBritishPostOfficeandbyhisemployer’sphilosophythat‘costisonlydearwhenmoney’spaidforanyschemethatfails…[and]itisnotawasteoftimetodothingswell’,CampbellcommissionedanexpertreportfromaLondonfirm,DeLaRue,andrefusedtoactoninstructionsunlesssignedbyHart.HewrotetoHartinMay(respondingtoDetring’senquiryofsomeweeksearlier)that:
IhavebeenmakingenquiriesforDetringrespectingpostagestamps,and…Ihopetohaveanelaboratereportreadybynextweek…andIamtoldnottoconsideranyordersofficialunlesstheybearyoursealandsignature.(InotebythewaythatRequisitionsaretobesignedinfuturebytheChiefSecretary.)97
CampbellwentsofarastoproposetakingtheentireCustomsPostprojectawayfromtheexistingCommissioners.‘IfyouintendtointroduceapostalsysteminChina,youought,Ifeelsure,tosecuretheservicesofathoroughlypracticalman.TheG.P.O.[GeneralPostOfficeinLondon]wouldnodoubtlendyouaman,buttheywouldhavethecreditoftheworkoftheCustoms.’Campbellhad,asheusuallydid,anomineeinmind:FrankIvesScudamore,apostaladministratoremployedbytheTurkishgovernment,whomCampbellconsideredwellqualifiedtotakeoverHart’spostalplans.98
899May1877inHart,‘DiaryVol.24’,p.109.
90Ibid.
91Campbell,p.
92.92Ibid.,p.3.
93JamesCampbelltoRobertHart,no.92,11May1877,SOAS,PPMS67/3/1/91.
94CampbelltoHart,4Jan.1878[A/147(A/151)],no.412inChenandHan,vol.Ip.333.
95HarttoCampbell,30Jan.1869,no.4inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.Ip.43;Kleinwächter’syoungerbrotherGeorge,alsoacustomsofficial,wasdischargedin1885forinsanityafteraccusinghisbrotherofcolludingwithGermanytointerferewithChina’sindemnitiestoFrance.Wright,HartandtheChineseCustoms,p.514.
96CampbelltoHart,4Jan.1878[A/148(A/152)],no.413inChenandHan,vol.Ip.334.
97JamesCampbelltoRobertHart,no.92,11May1877,SOAS,PPMS67/3/1/91.
98Ibid.ThenameismisreadbyChen&Hanas‘Sendamore’intheirno.345inChenandHan,vol.Ip.272.
Britishexpertise:theDeLaRuereport
Campbell’sinterventionwastheendofDetring’soriginalstampdesigns.ThecompanyCampbellconsulted,DeLaRue,wasaprominentBritishmanufacturerofstampsandbanknoteswithstrongviewsabouttheimportanceofexpertiseinstampproduction.TheGuernseyprinterThomasDeLaRuehadbeganmakingstampsinLondonin1855.Bythe1870s,thecompany(nowrunbyThomas’sgrandsonWarrenWilliam)wasBritain’sleadingproducerofadhesivestamps.DeLaRueinthisperiodwasnotedforitstechnicalratherthanartisticinnovation,withaconservativevisualstylethatemphasisedprecision.99WarrenWilliamDeLaRuehada‘onetrackmind’anda‘readinesstoexpoundtheunderlyingprinciplesofthefirm’sbusinessontheslightestexcuse,andatprodigiouslength’.100
CampbellwassufficientlyenthusedbythestampprojecttomakeapersonalinspectionofDeLaRue’spremises.101CampbellwasshownaroundbyWarrenWilliamDeLaRueinMay1877.102ItwasthenovertenyearssinceDeLaRue’shadlastbeencommissionedtoproduceforeignstamps(exceptingclientsintheBritishEmpire),butWarrenWilliamwasaccustomedtoinforminghisclientsofwhattheyneededratherthanincorporatingtheirsuggestions.103Stamps,heinsisted,shouldbeofDeLaRue’sstandardsize,shouldbedesignedwithfraudinmind(regardlessofthecircumstancesinwhichtheyweretobesold),andshouldbeprintedinEngland.
Thefactisthatstamp-printingisquiteadifferentarttoordinarytype-printing,anditrequiresmenspeciallyandhighlytrainedforthepurpose,workingunderourimmediateandclosepersonalsupervision.MoreoveritcanonlybecarriedtoasuccessfulissueinatemperateandequableclimatesuchasthatofEngland.104
DeLaRue’stypicallyexpansive42-pagereportwasnotfinisheduntil18June1877,andCampbellforwardedittoHarton22June.105NotcontentwithsimplydescribingthedeficienciesofDetring’sproposal,DeLaRue’sincludedhand-painteddesignsforthestampsinbothhorizontal(fig.1)andverticalformat.106Sincetheyhadnotbeengivenaspecification,107DeLaRue’shadtoguessatthedetails,notingoftheir‘alternativesketchesoftheproposedPostageStampsforChina[that]-thedutiesaremerelysuppositions’.Thedesignscompriseda1centdenominationinlake(pinkishred),a2centingreen,anda5centinorange.Forallvalues,thedesignincludedtwostyliseddragonsaroundayin-yangsymbol,withacomplexborder.Intheseessays,thevaluetabletinChinesewastheonlytext,reading‘一分’,‘二分’,or‘五分’(one,twoorfivecents).108
Fig.1:DeLaRueessays,horizontalformat(1877).ImagecourtesyofInterasiaAuctionsLtd.EmboldenedbyHart’sinstructionson9May,andstillwaitingforCampbelltoactonhisearlierletter,DetringwroteagaintoCampbell.AdetailedmemorandumaboutpostagestampsfromDetringtoCampbellwaslostinthepostwhenitwentdownwiththeMeikongoffthecoastofSomaliaon17June1877,butDetring’srequisitionforstampproductionequipmentarrivedwithCampbellwhiletheDeLaRuereportwasmakingitswaytoChina.On6July,CampbellwrotetoHartagainaboutDetring’sstamps.‘IhavebeenputinafixbyDetring’sRequisition’,Campbellcomplained.‘EvenifIweretoorderthethings,theywould[not]bereadyfor3or4months’.109AnticipatingDetring’sdisappointment,CampbellwassufficientlyanxioustotelegraphHart,warningthatDetring’sideasweremisguidedandthatstampproductionrequiredBritishexpertise:
99JohnEaston,TheDeLaRueHistoryofBritish&ForeignPostageStamps,1855to1901(London:PublishedfortheRoyalPhilatelicSocietybyFaber,1958),pp.xviii,xx.
100Ibid.,p.xix.
101Campbellcaughtacoldwhilehewasthere.CampbelltoHart,11May1877[Z/53],no.345inChenandHan,vol.Ip.272.
102‘DeLaRueCorrespondenceBookRelatingtoChina’,1877,PostalMuseum,London,DLR/31.
103Easton,pp.788–89.
104WarrenWilliamDeLaRue,2May1878,citedinEaston,p.791.
105DeLaRuedatedit8June:‘DeLaRueCorrespondenceBookRelatingtoChina’;Easton,p.832.Telegram,CampbelltoHart[no.171],4July1877,no.305inChenandHan,vol.IIIp.1058-9.
106AsAppendixJtothereport;reproductionsofthenowprivately-heldessaysareinFrankWalton,TheDeLaRueCollection(6vols.,London:TheRoyalPhilatelicSociety,2014),vol.2,pp2567.Seealso‘AppendixA’atp.2566.
107DeLaRue’soriginalhand-paintedessayswereformerlyintheDeLaRuearchives,butweresoldatauctionin1977(emailfromPostalMuseum,12June2018).
108DeLaRuealsosuppliedacircularrose-lilacdesignfora1centvalue,andadarkgreenoval2centwhichcouldbeembossedontoenvelopes,inadditiontoexamplesofenvelopeswiththestampedembossingonthem.SeeIreland,p.ix.
Postalrequisitionimpracticable.MachinePaperInkallunsuitableElaboratereportmailedtwentysecondJuneIfyousendimmediatelydesignforlaststampBritishpostagesizeandtelegraphinstructionsuponreceiptreportallkindscanbedeliveredheretenweeksafterwardspricefiftyfivePoundsperMillionSpecialexperiencerequiredTimeexpensesaved&protectionfromforgeryensuredbystartingmanufactureheretransferringtoChinaafterwards.110
Thefollowingweekon13July,CampbellwroteagaintoHart,excusinghisdecisionnottoundertakeDetring’sinstructioninmoredetail.‘Thedelaywill,nodoubt,causeyourdisappointment-butevenifIhadorderedthethingsfromthefirmsnamedintheRequisitions,sixmonthswouldprobablyelapsebeforetheyallreachedShanghai...ByemployingDeLaRue’snotonlywilltheorderbepromptlyexecuted,buttimeandexpensewillbesaved’.111CampbellwasmoreblunttoDetring,insistingtohiminAugust1877thatiftheyweretoproceed‘withoutproperappliancesitwouldsimplybecourtingimperfection’.112
ForCampbelltorefusetocarryoutaninstructionwhichDetringsaidhadbeensanctionedbyHartwasaradicaldepartureforamanwhomHart‘thoroughlytrusted’.113Campbell’schiefinstructiontohissonregardingHartwas‘heissternandrelentless…doyourbestandservehimloyally’.114YetCampbell’sexpectationthatHartwouldwishhimtodefyDetringandtoprocurestampsfromBritaininsteadwasareasonableone.HarthadmodelledhisbasicpostalprinciplesontheBritishPostOffice,sowhynotthestampsthemselves?Moreover,Hartgenerallysecuredforeign,typicallyBritish,expertstoadviseoninfrastructure.AsHansvandeVenhasnoted,infrastructuralprojectshadasymbolicfunction,exemplifyingthebenefitsof‘thecentralizationofpower,thecreationofanefficientandhonestbureaucracy,andtheadoptionofWesterntechnologies’.115WhenHartfinallyhadtime-oncehewasbackinBeijinginOctober1877-towritetoCampbellaboutthestamps,HartindeedagreedwithCampbellthatDetring’sproposalwouldnotdo.Cautiousasever,henotedtoCampbell,‘Idon’twanttofollowthesanguineDetringtoorashly.Imustfeelmyfootingtobesecurebeforeattemptingtopushon.’116HartwassatisfiedalsowithCampbell’sselectionofDeLaRue,concluding‘we’llgetourstampsmadethere’.117
DeLaRuedidnotgetthecommission,however,ThephilatelistPhilipIrelandcallsDeLaRue’sdesigns‘insipid’,andsuggeststhismaybewhytheywerenotapproved.118DeLaRue’sinflexibilityandimperiousmannerwereperhapsequallyoff-putting.ByJanuary1878,DeLaRuehad‘frequentlyenquired’whetheradecisionhadbeenmadeabouthisproposals.119DeLaRuealsosuppliedasetofChristmascardstotheBritishdiplomatHerbertGiles;GilespassedtheseontoJunQi,thenewChineseSuperintendentofCustomsatGuangzhou,whorepliedon25December1877:‘ofthepicturesyouwerekindenoughtoenclose,Icanonlysaythattheartisthasmadethemintolivingrealities’.120UsingGilestoreferthequestiontoaChineseCustomsSuperintendentwasprobablyanunwisemovebyDeLaRue,particularlyinviewofthestrainedrelationshipbetweenHartandtheBritishrepresentativesinChinaatthattime.Moreimportantly,DetringwasbecomingtiredofwaitingforHartandCampbelltotakeactiononthestamps.Neartheendof1877,‘actinguponinstructionsfromDetring’,F.A.Morgan(onleaveinLondon)beganmakingpostalenquiriesindependentofCampbell.121DetringwrotetoCampbellintersefashion,noting:
109CampbelltoHart,6July1877[A/127],no.363inChenandHan,vol.I,p.286.
110Telegram,CampbelltoHart[no.171],4July1877,no.305inChenandHan,vol.III,pp.1058–59.
111CampbelltoHart,13July1877[A/129],no.365inChenandHan,vol.I,pp.286–7.
112Campbell,p.92.
113Fairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,pp.8–9.
114Campbell,p.xviii.
115HansJ.vandeVen,BreakingwiththePast:TheMaritimeCustomsServiceandtheGlobalOriginsofModernityinChina(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,2014),p.90.
116HarttoCampbell,25Oct.1877,no.184inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,p.252.Hart’sfamous‘caution’hasbeennotedbyalmosteveryhistoriantohavewrittenabouthim.Morse,vol.III,p.399;Wright,HartandtheChineseCustoms,p.856.
117HarttoCampbell,25Oct.1877,no.184inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,p.252and253n3.
118Ireland,p.16.
119CampbelltoHart,4Jan.1878[A/147(A/151)],no.412inChenandHan,vol.Ip.333.
120‘DeLaRueCorrespondenceBookRelatingtoChina’.ThisremarkbyJunQi[ChünCh'i]haspreviouslybeenincorrectlydescribedasacommentonDeLaRue’sstampessays.
IhavereadDeLaRue’sreportonPostageStamps,andnowsendyouenclosedfourdesignswhichhavebeenadoptedbytheInspectorGeneralforthevariousHaikuanvaluesrequired.Thedesignsareofcoursetobereducedtoordinarypostagestampdimensions.Thecolourstobeusedare,youwillobserve,sufficientlyexplainedintheenclosure.122
Detringenclosedan‘orderforPostageStampstobetransmittedthroughtheNon-ResidentSecretary[Campbell]’,signedonlybyDetring.ThiswasthenthesecondoccasiononwhichDetringsentpostagestampdesignstoCampbellforprinting,andthethirdoccasiononwhichDetringhadsentCampbellastamp-relatedrequestwhichCampbelldidnotcarryout.CampbellinformedHarthewouldnotprocurethestampsunlesshereceivedordersfromHarthimself,excusinghimselfbyquotingbacktoHart‘[your]observation…thatyoumustfeelyourfootingtobesurebeforeattemptingtopushon’.123ThatwastheendofCampbell’sinvolvementintheproductionofCustomspostagestamps.
TheLargeDragonstamps
ExasperatedbyCampbell’srefusaltoeffecthisrequests,DetringnowpreferredtoavoiddealingwithLondonentirely.Detring’spersonalpositionandhislinkstoLiHongzhangwerestrengtheningby1878.124DetringwasconfirmedastheCustomsCommissionerinTianjinon1October1877.125AswellasimprovingtheexistingBeijing-TianjinandTianjinZhenjiangroutes,DetringwantedtoinitiateCustomspostalservicesattheothertwonortherntreatyportswhichlikeTianjinwereoftenice-boundinwinter,namelyZhifuandNiuzhuang.126MeanwhileHart’sprincipalconcernsinthespringof1878weretheimminentParisExhibition,aswellasChinesediplomacy,procurementofweapons,andHart’simminentreunificationwithhisfamily.127WhenHartleftBeijingforParison5March1878,thequestionofthestampshadyettoberesolved.On9March1878,asHartwaitedatTianjintoembarkfortheParisExhbition,hegaveDetringauthorisationtoexpandpostalservices,leavingDetringtofinalisethestamp.128
WithHartgone,DetringopenedadailypostalservicebetweenTianjinandBeijingon23March1878-twodaysafterHart’sshiptoEuropeleftChinesewaters.129Theservicewasofficiallyopenedtothepublicon1May1878-withoutpostagestamps.130HenceDetringlaunchedtheservicebeforetheCustomsPoststampswereready,exactlywhatHarthadwishedtoavoid.ByprintingthroughtheCustomsStatisticalDepartmentatShanghai,DetringcouldsettlethestampswithoutfurtherreferencetoHartorCampbell,orevenBredon,Hart’sbrother-in-lawandActingInspectorGeneral.131OneofDetring’sownstaff,H.B.Morse,wasactingasStatisticalSecretaryinShanghaiinthespringof1878andhadasignificantroleintheproductionofthestamps.132Thedesign,too,wasdonelocally.WrightrecordedthattheCustomsstampwas‘thedesignofaChineseartist’,butdidnotincludethename.133VariousdesignswereessayedbytheStatisticalDepartment,allsimilarinstyle:anelephant,alesswell-knownsix-storiedpagoda,andadragon.134Theapproveddesign(fig.2)wasmuchsimplerthanDeLaRue’sproposal,andshowedasinglecoiledfive-claweddragonsurroundingaflamingpearl,astraditionallyfoundinQingimperialiconography.135
121CampbelltoHart,4Jan.1878[A/147(A/151)],no.412inChenandHan,vol.I,p.334.
122CampbelltoHart,4Jan.1878[A/148(A/152)],no.413inChenandHan,vol.I,p.334.
123Ibid.
124Schmidt,pp.20,26–27.
125WeipinTsai,‘BreakingtheIce’,p.1758.
126’Chefoo’,China:ImperialMaritimeCustoms,p.74;Piry,p.xlv.Ontheoperationofthe1878services,seeWeipinTsai,‘BreakingtheIce’,pp.1758–64.
127Seee.g.HarttoCampbell28July1878,no.209inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.I,pp.271–272.
128March1878RobertHart,‘DiaryVol.25’,QUBSC,MS15/1/25passim.
129’SummaryofCustomsCommissioner’sReportontheworkingofTientsinOverlandCourierService(July1879)in‘AppendixB:TientsinCustomsPost’,pp.105–6.
130’Chihli’inReportontheChinesePostOffice,p.34;LiHongzhang,juan8f.18.
131TheepisodeseemstohavedamagedMorse’srelationshipwithDetring,whotookthefirstopportunitytobetransferredtoBeijinglaterin1878,sinceDetringwas‘notlikedattheInspectorate’.SeeJohnK.Fairbank,MarthaHendersonCoolidge,andRichardJ.Smith,H.B.Morse:CustomsCommissionerandHistorianofChina(Lexington:UniversityPressofKentucky,1995),p.48.
132Thoughhewasnottheartist,asissometimessuggested.SeeIreland,p.26.
Fig.2:LargeDragonstamp(setofallthreevalues).ThechoiceofadragonfortheCustomsstamp,overtheelephantorpagodadesigns,wasastraightforwardone.TheimperialdragonsymbolisedtheChinesestate,theauthorityofwhichHartwaskeentobothdemonstrateanddeploythroughtheCustomsPost.In1862,anazuredragonchasingapearlonayellowfieldhadbeenadoptedastheWestern-styleQingflag,andasimilarflagwasadoptedbytheMaritimeCustomsin1873.136Apartfromthepresenceofadragon,theapproveddesignwasverydifferentfromDeLaRue’sproposals,butboreastrikingresemblancetotheearlystampsoftheShanghaiLocalPost(fig.3).137AdministeredbytheShanghaiMunicipalCouncilintheInternationalConcession,theShanghaiLocalPosthadbegunissuingstampsinAugust1865,andbythetimeitclosedin1898,ithadproducedfourseparatestampissues.138Itsveryfirststamp,the‘BigDragonoftheMunicipalCouncil’,boreacoileddragonatitscentre.139TheCustomsLargeDragonnotonlycapitalisedonthefamiliarityoftheShanghaistamp;itwasalsoanefforttoclawbacktheimperialsymbolfromtheShanghaiMunicipalCouncil,whichfrequentlysoughttoexercisequasi-sovereignauthority,thumbingitsnoseattheChinesegovernment.WhenHartdiscoveredlaterthattheSMCwasconsideringjoiningtheUniversalPostalUnion,hewasincensed.140ForaforeignconcessiontojoinanmultinationalbodywouldundermineChina’ssovereignty,andHarttelegraphedCampbellthatheshouldimmediatelytellthePostalUnion‘thatcan’tbedone’since‘ShanghaiisnotfreetownbutChineseportcanneithernegotiatenorenter:andsuchrecognitionwillberesentedbyChinaandbringridiculeon[thePostal]Union’.141
Fig.3:ShanghaiBigDragon,1866.TheChinesetextreads‘上海工部書信舘六分銀’(ShanghaiWorksDepartmentPostOffice,SixCandarins)TheCustomsstampdesignbalancedDetring’spreoccupationswithHart’s.Thethree-candarinstamp,whichwastobethestandarddenomination,wasprintedinauspiciousredwhilethefive-candarinwaslightenedfromDeLaRue’sproposedorangetoimperialyellow.TheChinesetextaroundtheborderreadoptimistically‘大清郵政局’[GreatQingPostOffice],thoughnosuchimperialedicthadbeenissued.‘China’nowappearedinaEuropeanlanguage,aswasrequiredbytheUniversalPostalUnion.142ThevaluewasprintedbothinRomancharactersandinChinese,thelatterinbankers’numerals,as,‘壹’,‘叁’and‘伍’.Sinceeachdenominationwasadifferentcolour,theuseofanti-fraudnumeralswaslessaboutdiscouragingemendationsofthestampsthanitwasaboutgivingthestampstheappropriateairofauthority.
133NoteonCircular204inWright,InspectorGeneral’sCirculars,1861to1892,Documents,vol.I,p.437n;thisfootnoteisbytheeditor,StanleyWright;see‘Preface’.Theremarkisfrequently(butmistakenly)attributedtoHart(1882),e.g.inIreland,p.26.
134Ireland,pp.18–19.
135J.KeithWilson,‘PowerfulFormandPotentSymbol:TheDragoninAsia’,TheBulletinoftheClevelandMuseumofArt,77.8(1990),286–323(p.307).
136LaneHarris,‘StandardMessages:InstitutionalIdentityandSymbolisminChinesePostalFlags,1896–1949’,Raven:AJournalofVexillology,15(2008),81–106(p.85)
137LaneJ.Harris,‘StumblingtowardsEmpire:TheShanghaiLocalPostOffice,theTransnationalBritishCommunityandInformalEmpireinChina,1863–97’,TheJournalofImperialandCommonwealthHistory,2018,p.9
138‘AppendixC:NoteontheShanghai(Municipal)LocalPost’,inReportontheChinesePostOffice:FortheTenthYearofChung-HuaMin-Kuo(1921)(Shanghai:SupplyDept.oftheDirectorateGeneralofPosts,1922),pp.107–9(p.107).
139FanShi,TheStampsofChina:1878-1981(Beijing:ForeignlanguagesPress,1996),p.10.
140OntheSMC,seeIsabellaJackson,‘WhoRantheTreatyPorts?AStudyoftheShanghaiMunicipalCouncil’,inTreatyPortsinModernChina:Law,LandandPower,ed.byRobertA.BickersandIsabellaJackson,RoutledgeStudiesintheModernHistoryofAsia(MiltonPark,Abingdon,Oxon;NewYork,NY:Routledge,2016),pp.43–60;IsabellaJackson,ShapingModernShanghai:ColonialisminChina’sGlobalCity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2018).
14114Dec.1892inRobertHart,‘DiaryVol.42’,p.248,QUBSC,MS15/1/42;HarttoCampbell,telegram14Dec.1892[No.912],no.2067inChenandHan,vol.III,p.1286.
142Ireland,p.16.
Hart,CampbellandDetring
Noneofthethreemenmostinvolvedinthediscussionsoverthestampwassatisfiedwiththeoutcome.Campbell,whohadbeensoimpressedbyDeLaRue’sforcefulopinions,complainedoftheLargeDragonsthattheycouldnottrulybeconsideredpostagestampsasWesternersunderstoodthem:‘thestampsareamostcrudeaffairanddonotpossessanyofthequalitiesrequisiteforatruestamp’.143Detring,ontheotherhand,still‘preferredthedesignhe[originally]sentthrough’,whileHartwasvexedthatDetringhadproducedtheDragonswithoutgettingwiderCustomsapproval.144Aswellasthestampcontroversy,therewasaseriousincidentwherethecouriersontheTianjin-ZhenjiangroadwerearrestedandthemailinterruptedafterDetringconcludedanagreementwithadisreputableChineseintermediary.145ForHart,thiswasofapatternwithDetring’sfailuretoconsultcolleaguesintheCustomsServicebeforecommissioningthestamp.AfterHart’sreturnfromFrancetoChinain1879,hecomplainedthatDetringhadcommissionedthestampwithoutconsultingcolleaguesandurgedDetringinfuturetogetofficialapprovalbeforetakingsignificantdecisions.146
BothCampbellandDetringremainedangryabouttheDragonStampforyearsafterwards,andthestampcontroversycontributedtoDetringoperatingwithincreasingindependencefromtheCustomsadministration.Campbell’sannoyanceovertheincidentseepsfromthepagesofthebiographywrittenbyhisson,forwhom‘Detringwasanobstinatemanwholikedtohavehisownway’.147In1881,DetringcomplainedaboutCampbellatlengthtoanotherCustomsCommissioner,F.E.Taylor,whodidhisbesttobrokerpeace:
IhadalongtalkwithDetring…onthepostalstampbusiness.Iexplainedthatyouranxietyonthematterandyourwishtohavethepostalservicesecurelyinstitutedhadbeenthecauseofyournotfulfillinghisrequisition,andofcourseyouhadnoauthorityfromtheI.G.IalsosaidthatyouwereauthorisedbytheI.G.toobtainprofessionaladviceinthematterandthatprofessionaladvicewasstronglyagainstthematterbeingstartedintheproposedway.148
On22December1879,HartappointedDetring‘CommissionerforPostalMatters’,despiteHart’sfrustrationswithDetring’s‘sanguine’approach,whichhadcontributedtoseveralpostalembarrassmentsaswellassuccesses.Alsoin1879,theCustomsPostwasextendedtofurtherportsandgiventhename‘PostOfficeoftheMaritimeCustoms’(海關撥驷達書信館).149AllotherCustomsCommissionerswereinstructedbyHartthat‘thedirectionswhichMrDetring,inpurelypostalmatters,willhereafterissuearetobegiveneffectbyyou’.150ThiswasanotabledeviationfromoneofHart’sfoundationalprinciplesfortheIMC:thatnoCommissionershouldbesuperiortoanyother.Inhis1864codeofconductfortheCustoms,Harthadstatedthathewould‘totallydisapproveofanyinterference,onthepartofanyCommissioner,withaffairsofanykind…atanotherport…itistobeclearlyunderstood…thatwhateverbetheirtitles,andwhatevertheirratesofpay,theofficersselectedtotakechargeoftheportsareregardedbytheInspectorGeneralas…onpreciselythesamefooting.’151
Detring’selevation,despitehisearlypostalsetbacks,wasduetobothhisenthusiasmandhisrelationshipwithLiHongzhang.HarthadbrieflyconsideredreplacingDetringinJuly1879,butLiwasexperimentingwithrailwaysandtelegraphs.152Inthatyear,LiopenedatelegraphlinebetweenTianjinandthecoastatDagu,andtwoyearslateralinefromTianjintoShanghai.153LialsoarrangedfortheCustomsPosttohavefreeuseofhisChinaMerchantsSteamNavigationCompany.154LigavetheYamenacautiouslypositivereportonDetringandHart’sexperiment.LiandHart’srelationshiphadalwaysbeenacomplexone,andLibrieflyproposedtakingthepostalserviceoutofHart’scontrolandplacingitunderChineseterritorialauthority,evenatthecostofunderminingitsnationalscope.155In1881LiconsideredtryingtoputtheAmericansincontrolofthepostalservicewhilenegotiatingtheKorean-AmericantreatywiththeUSNavyCommodoreRobertWilsonShufeldt.156Intheend,though,LiraisednoseriousobjectionstotheCustomsPostremainingwithHart,knowingitwasundertheday-to-daycontrolofDetring.
143Campbell,p.92.
144Ibid..
145WeipinTsai,‘BreakingtheIce’,p.1768.
146Ibid.,p.1777.
147Campbell,p.92.
148Ibid.
149‘Chihli’inReportontheChinesePostOffice,p.34.
150RobertHart,‘PostalService:ExperimentalEstablishmentattheNorthernPorts,andProposedGradualExtension[CircularNo.89,2ndSer.],22Dec.1879’,inInspectorGeneral’sCirculars,1861to1892,ed.byStanleyFowlerWright,Documents,vol.1,pp.401–2(p.402).
151Hart,‘TheCustomsService,theSpiritThatOughttoAnimateIt’,pp.43,45.
Detring’sgrowingpowerandautonomyfromHarthadbecomecommonknowledgefarbeyondChina.AnofficialinBritain’sIndiaOffice,JosephSamuel,toldCampbellinAugust1881afteravisittoChinathat‘D[etring]employedanumberofagentsforLi,tosupplythingsanddoworkofvariouskinds.’157Similarly,DetringtoldTaylorin1881that‘hedoeseverythingforLi[Hongzhang]throughagents,whogettheir5%andsaveallbotheraboutgettingauthorityfromtheI.G.andsoon’.158HartwasatfirstbothcalmandphilosophicalaboutDetring’sgrowinginfluencewithLiHongzhang,concluding‘hecertainlygotonwellwithLi,whobothlikedhimpersonallyandmademuchofhimasaGerman…Idoubtthoughifheisprincipaltotheextentthathethinks.Li’sdisappearancewouldbealosstohim,butIdon’tthinkitwouldaffecttheCustoms.’159
Bythe1880s,HartbegantofearhewouldlosehisjobtoDetring.In1883,HartwentsofarastowarnCampbelltotrytogetalongwithDetringasalikelysuccessortoHart,instructingCampbellto‘makefriendsoftheMammonofunrighteousness’.160In1885,HartwasofferedthepostofBritishrepresentativeinBeijing,evensubmittinghisresignationfromtheCustoms,buthewithdrewitwhenherealisedhewouldnotbeabletopreventGustavDetring’sappointmentashissuccessor.161HartwasuncertainwhoseinterestsDetringwasadvancing,wonderingin1884‘isD.PlayingBismarck’sgame…orFrance’s(heisfromAix-laChapelle)…orChina’stoavertwaratanyprice,orhisowntospillTseng[ZengGuofan]-orisithisloveforintrigueanddiplomacyonly?’.162Samuelobservedalreadyin1881that‘theGermaninfluencewassogreatinChina,therewouldbelittlecomingtothisCountry[Britain].’163Detring’sapproachtoChinesereformwonhimmorecommercialthandiplomaticalliesinGermany,however,andtheGermangovernmentwasnotkeenforhimtosucceedHart,consideringDetringabetterfriendtoChinathantoGermany.164
FromCustomsPosttoImperialPost
Thestamps,liketheearlyCustomsPostitself,hadonlylimitedinitialsuccess.Onlyafewthousandofeachofthethreedenominationswerepurchasedduringthefirstyearofissue.165TheearlyCustomsPosthadsomevocalcritics,particularlyamongthosewhowantedtopreservethepatchworkofcommercial,municipalandforeignnationalpostalservicesoperatinginChinainthelaternineteenthcentury.TheadvanceoftheQingstateintopostalserviceswasregardedwithmistrustbyforeignersandChinesealike.MostChinesesimplydeclinedtousetheservice,withtheforeignpopulationamuchbetterpredictorofthedemandfortheCustomsPostinaparticularportthanthepopulationasawhole.166ThathadadvantagesfromHart’sperspective;LiHongzhangreportedtotheYamenthat,justasLihadintended,Hart’sschemehadnotunderminedtheI-zhanorthexinju.167ForeignerswerealsoscepticaloftheCustomsPost,oftenentrustingtheirmailtothefree,thoughsomewhatunreliableserviceofferedbetweentreatyportsbythesteamercompanies.TheJapaneseMinistercomplainedabout‘highpostagerates’and‘inefficiency.LiHongzhangconsideredtheJapanesechargesunfoundedattemptstodiscouragethedissolutionoftheforeignpostalagencies’.168TheJapaneseministermighthavebeenquotingfromtheNorthChinaHerald,whichwasscathinginitscondemnationoftheCustomsPost.TheNorthChinaHeraldinMarch1879snipedthat‘everyonesympathiseswithourenterprisingCommissioner[Detring]forhisendeavourstocivilizeChinabyadoseofprogress,andforhavingmetwithsuchacoldshoulderfromhis“friends”[i.e.Chineseofficials]’butthatdidnotstoptheHeraldconcludingthat‘thereisnotmuchwisdomintheactionofthosewhohaveriskedvaluableofficialandcommercialcorrespondencebycommittingittoirresponsiblepersons[i.e.theCustomsPost]’.169CampbellderivedsomesatisfactionfromDetring’sdiscomfiture,tellinganotherCustomsofficial,WilliamCartwright,that
152HarttoCampbell,27July1879,no.252inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.I,p.298.
153Chu,p.6.
154’Chihli’inReportontheChinesePostOffice,p.34.
155ChengYing-wan,p.75alson67.
156HarttoCampbell,26Aug.1881,no.337inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.I,p.382.
157CampbelltoHart,26Aug.1881,no.854[Z/164]inChenandHan,vol.I,pp667–8.
158Campbell,p.92.
159HarttoCampbell,24July1883,no.427inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.I,p.477.
160Ibid.,pp.477–478.
161Morse,vol.III,p.407;alsovol.II,pp.368-372.
162HarttoCampbell,27Apr.1884,no.477inFairbank,Bruner,andMatheson,vol.I,p.541.
163CampbelltoHart,26Aug.1881,no.854[Z/164]inChenandHan,vol.I,pp667–8.
164Morse,vol.II,p.372.
165‘AppendixA:NoteonthePostageStampsofChina’,inReportontheChinesePostOffice:FortheTenthYearofChung-HuaMin-Kuo(1921)(Shanghai:SupplyDept.oftheDirectorateGeneralofPosts,1922),pp.98–104(p.98).
fromtheaccountsinthenewspapers,thepostalexperimentseemstohavebeenafailure.Itisapitytocommenceaserviceofthatkindbeforethearrangementshavebeenproperlymatured.170
OnesupporteroftheCustomsPostwastheUniversalPostalUnion,thebodyfoundedin1874whichcoordinatedinternationalpostalagreements.171AsKirkhopeboasted,‘itsaysmuchforthesuccessoftheyouthfulService…that,in1878….ChinawasformallyinvitedtojointheInternationalPostalUnion’.172StampswerecustomaryforPostalUnionmembershipsinceoneoftheUnion’sprincipleswasmutualrecognitionandfreecarriageofothermembers’properlystampedmail.173Wherestampswerenotpresent,postalserviceswereexpectedtowriteanoteexplainingthevaluepaidandhand-stampingtheitemaccordingly.174TheinvitationfromthePostalUnionreflectsnot‘success’inthesenseofmailvolumesorevenpopularityamongcustomers,butratherthatHarthadsucceededinstructuringaservicewhich,fromthevantagepointofBerneinSwitzerland,lookedthewayapostalservicewassupposedtolook,embodyingtheapproachdevelopedinBritainandotherWesterncountries,andmandatedbythePostalUnion.Hartdeclinedtheinvitation,onthebasisthatitcouldnotclaimtobeChina’snationalpostalservicewhiletheI-zhan,minchuandforeignpostalserviceswereallstillinoperation.175
Despiteitsearlydifficulties,theCustomsPostbecamewellestablishedbythe1880s,andthepotentialrevenuefromanationalpostalservicewasincreasinglyattractivetothegovernmentbytheendofthecentury.On20March1896,theCustomspostalservicebecametheImperialPost,stillundertheInspector-GeneralofMaritimeCustoms,butwithoutDetring,whowasbythenmorefocusedonadvisingLiHongzhang,andonminingandrailways.176Hartremainedin1896ascarefulinhisapproachtopostalexpansionashehadeverbeen.Hart’scautiousexcitementabouttheImperialPostispreservedinajauntyepistolarypoemhewroteon25January1897toHenryKopsch,thenewPostalSecretary.Hartcautioned,‘Ifear,themoreyouhurry,themorewillbeourworry,andIthinkthepostalbusinessoughtnottogotoofast:whatnowconcernsusmostisjusttheChinesecoast-what’sforeignwillcomeeasier,takenlast.First,getridofalldisorderinsideourproperborder.’177WithLiHongzhang’swarningsoftwentyyearsearlierperhapsstillringinginhisears,hetoldthestaffofthenewservicethatitwasimportantnotto‘hurtdeservingpeople’slivelihoodsbyunnecessaryinterferencewithexistinginstitutionsorembarrassandoccasiondifficultiesforofficialsandgovernments’.178TheChinesePostOfficebecameindependentoftheCustomsin1911,onlythreeyearsafterHart’sdeparturefromChina.179
166ChengYing-wan,p.77.
167LiHongzhang,juan8,f.18.
168Ibid.
169NorthChinaHerald,28Mar.1879,p.303.TheEnglish-languageNCHwassupportiveoftheShanghaiLocalPost,whiletheBritish-owned,Chinese-languageShenbaotookamorepositiveviewoftheCustomsventureasanexampleofSino-foreigncooperation.
170Campbell,p.92.
171UniversalPostalUnion,TreatyConcerningtheFormationofaGeneralPostalUnionSignedatBerne,October9,1874.(Washington:Govt.Print.Off.,1875).
172Kirkhope,‘TheChinesePostOffice’,p.7.TheGeneralPostalUnionbecametheUniversalPostalUnionin1878.MostChinapostalsourcesrefertothisbodyasthe‘InternationalPostalUnion’.
173TheUPUeventuallygrantedChinatherighttoimposechargesonrecipientsofcertaininternationalmailinviewof‘thehighcostoftransmissionover-land-courir[sic]linestoatotaldistanceof60000kmmuststillbekeptup’.See‘ForeignPostalOfficesinChina’,trans.byC.T.D.Neil,1912,sec.§8III.d,QUBSC,MS19/14.
174UniversalPostalUnion,pp.22–23.
175Kirkhope,‘TheChinesePostOffice’,p.7.SeealsoLaneJeremyHarris,pp.118–19.ChinafinallybecameafullmenberofthePostalUniononlyin1914Chu,p.21n.
176Hart,‘ChineseImperialPost:InauguratedbyImperialDecree[CircularNo.706,SecondSeries],9thApril1896’,vol.II,p.42.
Conclusion
TheissueofthefirstCustomspostagestampemergedfromtwoquestionsofauthority:ofHart’s(andDetring’s)authoritywithintheMaritimeCustoms,supportedbyChineseandforeignpatrons;andoftheauthorityoftheCustomsPost(andtheQingstateitself)torepresentChina,inthecontextofmountingforeignpressure.ThefirstCustomsstampwasproducedunderverydifferentcircumstancesfromthoseenvisagedbyHartandCampbell.Itwasnotdesignedbyaforeignexpert,orinlinewithwhatWesternersconsideredproperpractice.Hartdidnotevenapprovethedesign.Detring’simpatienceledhimtoapproachthepostalexperimentinariskierfashionthanHartwouldhavepreferred.ThoughDetringexceededhisauthorityinissuingthem,hehadcapturedsomeofwhatHartwantedtoachieveinastamp,andthe1878LargeDragondesign,showinganimperialdragonamongclouds,wasreissuedessentiallyunchangedforsevenyears.TheSmallDragonsetissuedin1885retainedmuchofthedesignofthe1878issue;onlythe1894JubileesetforEmpressCixi’ssixtiethbirthdaywassubstantiallydifferent,incorporatingthelongevitycharacteroftenassociatedwithCixi.180TheLargeDragonconformedtoUniversalPostalUnionrequirementswhich,notably,theDeLaRuedesignhadnot.181Justasimportantly,theLargeDragonassertedtheauthorityoftheQingstateoneveryenvelopethatboreit,andreappropriatedtheimperialsymbolfromtheShanghaiInternationalSettlement.
Aswehaveseen,HartwasnotalwaysabletoinsertChinaintoglobalinfrastructuralnetworksashewished.Whereashehadarelativelyfreehandincertainareas,suchaslighthouses,inmanyothersHartwasconstrainedbydiversepressures,bothChineseandforeign,pullinginmultipledirections.Historiansofimperialismoncenotedthepotentialinfluenceofthe‘manonthespot’:anindividualmakingapparentlyminordecisionswithsignificant,sometimesunintendedconsequencesforsubsequentimperialpolicy.182Individualsresponsibleforinfrastructure,communicationsandsoforthcouldexercisesimilarlyoutsizeimportanceontheglobalnetworkswhichemerged,andwhobenefitedfromthem.ThehistoryofboththeCustomsandImperialPostsunderscoresboththeextentandthelimitsofHart’sinfluence.ThoughHarthasoftenbeenpresentedasanagentofBritishinterestswithintheChinesegovernment,evenBritishofficials(nottomentionChineseandotherforeigners)wereattimeswaryofconcentratingtoomuchpowerinHart’shands.
Boththestamp’sdesignandthecircumstancesofitsproductionillustratetheemerginggulfbetweenHartandDetring,mirroringanemergingdisagreementbetweenHartandLiHongzhangoverhowChinashouldbechanged.ForHart,ChinawouldearntherespectofforeignpowersbylookinglikeaWesternstate,commissioningitsstampsfromBritish‘experts’(evenifthoseexpertssometimesmademistakesabouttheWest’sownrules),andnotopeningapostalserviceuntilithadthestampstolookthepart.Detring’sprioritieswerealreadyinthe1870smorepracticalandurgent,focusedlessonglobalperceptionsandmoreoninfrastructureandengineering,andDetringdrewhisinfluenceatleastasmuchfromLiHongzhangasfromGermany.TheLargeDragonstampsmaterialisedtheCustoms’complexrelationshiptotheChinesenationalinterest:thestampsassertedChinesesovereignty,whilesimultaneouslyfacilitatingtheglobalconnectionswhichweredestabilisingtheChinesestate.
177Morse,vol.III,pp.63-64n10.
178Hart,‘ChineseImperialPost:InauguratedbyImperialDecree[CircularNo.706,SecondSeries],9thApril1896’,p.42.
179Kirkhope,‘TheChinesePostOffice’,pp.9–10.
180FanShi,p.10ff.DavidHogge,‘PietyandPower:TheTheatricalImagesofEmpressDowagerCixi’,TheTrans-AsiaPhotographyReview,2.1(2011);HartputconsiderableeffortintotheJubileestamps,thoughtheiroptimistictonewassouredbytheoutbreakoftheFirstSino-JapaneseWar.SeeChengYing-wan,p.75,espn65and66;FanShi,p.11.
181Ireland,p.16.
182RobinWinks,TheHistoriographyoftheBritishEmpire-Commonwealth:Trends,InterpretationsandResources(Durham,N.C.:DukeUniversityPress,1966),p.13.